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Abstract 
This paper provides an overview of issues relating to aid effectiveness. It argues 
that it is impossible to give a definitive answer to the question of whether aid is 
effective, and that it is more useful to ask what can be done to make aid more 
effective. The paper then groups the various determinants of aid effectiveness, as 
well  as  strategies  to  improve  effectiveness,  under  three  headings:  the 
performance of the recipient (developing) country government; the performance 
of the aid agency of the donor (developed) country; and the interaction between 
the  two.  This  provides,  it  is  argued,  a  useful  framework  within  which  to 
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An overview of aid effectiveness determinants and strategies 
1.  Introduction 
This paper provides an overview of the issues relating to aid effectiveness. It explains 
the various factors which may influence aid effectiveness, as well as the strategies to 
address them, and places both within a simple conceptual framework. 
The next section provides the context with an examination of recent aid trends. Section 
3 explains why it is impossible to give a definitive answer to the question of whether aid 
is effective, and argues that it is more useful to ask what can be done to make aid more 
effective. Section 4 outlines the three categories of determinants of aid effectiveness: the 
performance of the recipient (developing) country government; the performance of the 
aid  agency  of  the  donor  (developed)  country;  and  the  interaction  between  the  two. 
Sections 5 to 7 consider each of these determinants in turn, with a focus on strategies to 
address them. Section 8 concludes. 
2. Recent aid trends 
After  a  period  of  stagnation,  official  development  assistance  (ODA,  or,  simply,  aid) 
volumes started increasing around the turn of the century.1 Figure 1 shows total and 
Australian official aid since the mid‐eighties (with aid in 1986‐87 set equal to one). The 
total  (OECD)  aid  figure  includes  both  bilateral  aid  directly  from  individual  OECD 
countries and multilateral aid routed through agencies  such as the World Bank.2  As 
Figure 1 shows, official aid volumes in the mid‐ and late‐nineties were, in real terms, at 
the same level as at the mid‐eighties. But in around 2000 they started to increase, and by 
2006 aid was 60% above 1999 levels. For Australia, the increase came later, but has 
been  of  a  similar  magnitude.  Aid  has  increased  for  a  number  of  reasons.  Greater 
prosperity in the West, and improved budgetary positions facilitated greater generosity. 
The  focus  on  the  Millenium  Development  Goals  generated  support  in  the  West  for 
greater aid in an effort to ‘Make Poverty History,’ in the words of a popular campaigning 
                                                        
 
1 For a concise history of the evolution of the post‐war aid architecture, see World Bank (2007, Annex I). 
2 Roughly, bilateral agencies make up 70% of this total and multilateral about 30%.  There are about 20 
OECD donors included in this total. These are the members of the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC), and include all the major OECD bilateral donors (World Bank 2007). 2 
 
slogan. Perhaps most  importantly of all, the terrorist  attacks of September 11,  2001 
sensitized the West to the cost of failed states.3 
While the long‐held but rarely‐met commitment of OECD countries to increase aid to 
0.7% of Gross National Income still looks out of reach, official commitments indicate 
more aid will be on its way. The 2005 G8 Gleneagles Communiqué estimated that OECD 
aid in 2010 would be up on 2004 levels by $US 50 billion, which would require another 
$24 billion on 2007 levels. Australia has undertaken to increase aid to 0.5% of GNI by 
2015, up from 0.32% in 2007. The global financial crisis and subsequent recession has 
reduced  the  prospects  of  these  increases  being  met,  though  Australia  has  recently 
reiterated its 2015 commitment. 
Figure 1: The increase in official aid volumes from OECD (bilateral and 
multilateral) and Australia relative to 198687 (set equal to 1), measured in 2006 
USD. 
 
Note and source: Net disbursements. DAC Aid statistics http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/9/41808765.xls  
Non‐government and non‐OECD aid is also growing. Kharas (2007) estimates that global 
private aid might be at around $US 37‐44 billion a year, compared to the $US 100 billion 
of OECD official aid. Kharas also finds that non‐government aid is expanding rapidly, 
                                                        
 
3 President Bush announced a 50% increase in US ODA on March 14, 2002 (Easterly 2006, p. 47). 3 
 
with a four‐fold rate of increase per decade, at which rate it will not be long before 
private aid comes to match official aid in magnitude. Some countries from outside the 
OECD are increasingly active as aid donors, including China and India and some Middle‐
eastern countries. Kharas estimates that countries from outside the OECD contributed 
about $US 8 billion of aid in 2005, an amount which is also growing quickly. 
The number of aid agencies is also on the increase. At the start of the century, the United 
States had one aid agency but now it has three.4 In many countries, other government 
departments  have  become  more  involved  in  the  delivery  of  the  aid   program.  In 
Australia, aid spending by agencies other than AusAID grew from  6% of total aid in 
1996‐97  to  about  25%  in  2005‐06  (AusAID  2005,  p.  14).  There  are  also  a  growing 
number of multilateral actors, with the emergence of specialized agencies such as the 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. A recent estimate puts at over 230 
the  number of  official  ‘international  organizations,  funds,  and  programs’  involved  in 
providing aid, with over than 100 in the health sector alone (World Bank 2007, p. ii). 
There  are  new  private  foundations,  most  famously  the  Bill  and  Melinda  Gates 
Foundation.  And  of  course  there  has  been  the  entry  of  new  non‐OECD  government 
agencies.  
The type of countries receiving aid has also changed. East Asian countries such as Korea 
and China have gone from being aid recipients to aid donors. As successful countries 
graduate from recipient status, those receiving aid are increasingly in the ‘hard to aid’ 
category. Moreover, aid is being used increasingly in conflict situations. Countries which 
are seen as terrorist  threats or havens  such  as  Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan  have 
become increasingly important to donors. The sums of money involved are large. In 
2006,  the  United  States  Department  of  Defence,  which  primarily  operates  in  these 
countries, was responsible for 21% of US ODA, up from 6% in 2002 (Petřík 2008).5 
Another estimate has one‐third of United States aid going to the twin wars on terror and 
drugs (Oxfam America 2008). Closer to home, Australian aid also plays a peacekeeping 
role in East Timor and Solomon Islands. Clearly, the aid effectiveness challenges in these 
                                                        
 
4 As well as the United States Agency for International Development, the Millenium Challenge Corporation 
(2002) and the U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), under the Direction of the US 
Global AIDS Coordinator in the Department of State (2003) 
5 Note that this is not military expenditure which doesn’t count as ODA, but reconstruction funding 
administered by the Department of Defence. 4 
 
countries are very different to, and more severe than, those in countries which are at 
peace. In general, the environment within which aid is being delivered is becoming more 
difficult.  
Finally, the way in which aid is being delivered is also changing. The typical intervention 
by an  aid agency in the early decades of aid, say the 1960s, was  a  five‐year capital 
project, such as the construction of a power plant. The recipient country was meant to 
ensure  the  sustainability  of  the  project  by  supplying  recurrent  funding.  But  as  aid 
agencies have moved into the social sectors, and as they have seen recipient countries 
unable to supply recurrent funding, and overwhelmed by too many projects, they have 
moved away from the project-based approach in two directions. First, they have come to 
stress more the  importance of having a country strategy, of individual interventions 
being consistent with that strategy, and of evaluating success at the country rather than 
project  level.  Second,  they  have  come  to  stress  the  need  for  broad  and  long-term 
support,  including  for  recurrent  funding,  provided  through  programs  rather  than 
projects. At the extreme, some agencies provided un‐earmarked budget funding, though 
this  form  of  aid  makes  up  only  about  5%  of  OECD  aid  (World  Bank  2007).  More 
commonly, donors increasingly provide support for sectors (e.g. primary education) as 
against  projects  (building  schools).  Sector  programs  –  wide‐ranging  programs  in 
particular sectors which any number of donors can support – expanded from only 1% of 
total OECD aid in 2001 to 15% in 2004 (World Bank 2007). 
3. Is aid effective? 
The starting point for any analysis of aid effectiveness must be the objectives of aid, 
since the effectiveness of an instrument can only be defined in relation to its objectives. 
Aid can have several objectives. Nearly all countries have signed up to the Millennium 
Development  Goals,  which  articulate  a  number  of  development  goals  for developing 
nations to be achieved by 2015, such as the  halving of extreme poverty, and which 
emphasize the provision of aid as important for the achievement of these goals. But aid 
also has commercial, political, diplomatic and security objectives. Indeed, some critics 
argue  that  these  other  objectives  are  more  important  than  any  poverty‐reduction 
objective  (Ridell  2007).  For  example,  one  of  five  objectives  of  the  United  States 
International Agency for Development (USAID) in 2004 was to support ‘US geostrategic 5 
 
interests’ (USAID 2004). American aid is still tied to the purchase of American goods and 
services.6 For the Australian aid program, the objective is ‘to assist developing countries 
reduce poverty and achieve sustainable development, in line with Australia's national 
interest.’7 
Should aid effectiveness then be assessed only in relation to poverty reduction, or also in 
relation to the other objectives it serves, for example, its ability to advance the national 
interest? A more accurate assessment would take the latter  approach, but, even just 
taking a single objective, the analysis of aid effectiveness is difficult enough. This paper 
assesses the effectiveness of aid  against  the  single  objective of poverty reduction  in 
developing countries. This is an important limitation. Some aspects of aid, which are 
sub‐optimal from the perspective of poverty reduction, make good sense once the other 
objectives of aid giving are understood. For example, as we will see later in the paper, 
aid agencies are not selective enough. They spread their funds too widely, resulting in 
high  fragmentation  and  transaction  costs.  No  doubt,  the  objective  of  global  poverty 
reduction would benefit from greater specialization. But it is not in the national interest 
of donors to specialize. Donors want to spread their money around many countries, and 
many sectors in order that they can be visible, and be seen to be helpful. Such symbolic 
acts advance the national interest, but undermine the goal of poverty reduction.  
Does  aid  help  reduce  global  poverty?  There  is  certainly  an  official  international 
consensus that it does. The 2002 Monterrey conference on financing for development, 
which enjoyed widespread and high‐level participation from the world’s nations, noted 
that aid ‘plays an essential role… especially in those countries with the least capacity to 
attract private direct investment.’ And recognized that ‘a substantial increase in ODA 
and other resources will be required if developing countries are to achieve’ the MDGs. 
By contrast, in the academic literature on aid, there are a wide range of often conflicting 
views on aid effectiveness. These can be distinguished along two dimensions – good and 
bad, large and small – giving rise to four distinct views: 
                                                        
 
6 An exception to this is aid from the Millenium Challenge Corporation. 
7 http://www.ausaid.gov.au/makediff/default.cfm, February 5 2009. 6 
 
  Some, such as Jeffrey Sachs (2005), argue that aid could have a transformative 
(good and large) effect if applied in the right way and in large enough volumes. 
Aid, Sachs argues, could help countries escape from poverty traps by supplying 
much needed investment which poor countries are unable to provide from their 
own meager resources. 
  Others  agree  that  aid  can  have  a  large  impact,  but  in  a  negative  rather  than 
positive direction. The well‐known critics Bauer and Yamey (1982) argued that 
aid  has  “far‐reaching  damaging  political  and  economic  results”  since  it 
strengthens  the  hand  of  incompetent  domestic  governments  and  thereby 
“promotes  the  disasterous  politiciziation  of  life  in  the  Third  World.”  A  more 
recent  re‐statement  of  the  Bauer‐Yamey  position  can  be  found  in  Moss, 
Pettersson and van de Walle (2008).8 
  A third group argue that aid is a minor determinant of development, the key 
ingredients for which are domestic, but that it can be a positive contributor at the 
margin.  Lewis  (1982)  illustrates  this  view:  “The  aid  input  usually  is  a  minor 
determinant of development outcomes; it can catalyze internal forces positively, 
but it can also fail to do so – or be swamped by extraneous circumstances.” Or 
more  recently,  as  argued  by  Rodrik,  Birdsall  and  Subramaniam  (2005): 
“sustained growth and poverty reduction depends…principally on the recipient 
country. At its best, aid can help reconstruction, remove certain bottlenecks, and 
finance useful public projects; what it cannot do is ignite or sustain economic 
growth.” 
  Last  but  not  least,  Easterly  (2006)  agrees  with  the  view  that  the  main 
determinant of domestic success is domestic institutions. Though he concedes 
that aid has some good results to its credit, his concurrence with the view that aid 
‘probably  worsens’  bad  governments  (p.  157)  represents  the  fourth  possible 
combination of views: aid as a minor but negative determinant of development. 
Which of these views is correct? Clearly, much depends on the country concerned. In 
aggregate, aid volumes are small relative to other financial flows, and, even more so, 
                                                        
 
8 Moss, Pettersson and van de Walle (2008) conclude from their review of the literature that ‘a large and 
sustained volume of aid can have negative effects on the development of public good institutions in low‐
income countries.’ (p. 274), though the authors concede that this is only a ‘tentative claim.’ 7 
 
relative to economic activity in developing countries. Aid volumes sound large when 
stated in total, cumulative terms, but much less in terms of annual, per capita spending. 
Thus post‐war aid by some estimates is $US2.3 trillion, but this amounts to only $US14 
per person  per year in poor countries (Radalet  2006). It  is unlikely that  such small 
volumes of financing can have a large impact in either a positive or a negative direction. 
But aid can be much more influential in the poorest, and often smallest economies. In the 
average  sub‐Sahara  African  country,  in  the  late  nineties,  aid  was  about  5%  of  GDP 
(Lancaster 1999). There are 25 low‐income countries where aid is more than half of 
government expenditure (Moss & Subramanian 2005). 
Certainly, one can point to cases where aid has helped deliver spectacular results. The 
Marshall Plan – the financing by the United States of Europe’s postwar reconstruction – 
is often cited as aid’s finest moment. Aid financed the research and extension projects 
which led to the adoption of high‐yielding wheat varieties by India’s farmers. This Green 
Revolution dramatically increased crop yields and reduced poverty.9 Bangladesh has 
been partially transformed by its  huge NGOs, all of  which grew with the support of 
international donors. The global campaigns which eradicated smallpox and polio were 
aid‐financed.  More  generally,  aid  has  probably  contributed  to  the  impressive  rise  in 
literacy and life expectancy in developing countries (Easterly 2006, p. 176). Closer to 
home, and more recently, Australian aid has helped stabilize countries in distress, Timor 
Leste, and the Solomon Islands. 
But there are also counter‐examples, where aid has not made any positive contribution 
or made things worse. Maren (1997) blames Somalia’s civil wars on competition for 
controlling of large‐scale food aid.10 Australia’s technical assistance to the Timor Leste 
police force did nothing to prevent police involvement in the violent destabilization of 
that country’s government in 2006. 
Many economists have tried to provide a quantitative answer to the question of aid 
effectiveness by examining economic data and asking whether more aid has led to more 
rapid  growth.  McGillivray  and  colleagues  (2005)  have  concluded  that  that  the  vast 
majority of studies published since 1998 find that growth would be lower in the absence 
                                                        
 
9 India went from producing 11 million tons of wheat in 1960 to 55 million in 1990. 
10 Extracted from Knack (1999). 8 
 
of aid. But there are notable dissenters, including Rajan and Subramaniam (2005) and 
Easterly (2003). Another survey by Doucouliagos and Paldam (2009) reach the opposite 
conclusion, namely that ‘the preponderance of the evidence indicates that aid has not 
been effective.’ Papers by Pritchett (2000), Roodman (2007a, 2007b) and Deaton (2009) 
cast significant doubt on the validity of the econometric methods used to establish (or 
disprove) an aid-growth link. 
Why  is  it  so  difficult  to determine  the  effectiveness  of  aid?  One  reason  is  that  it  is 
difficult to establish the counter‐factual. What would country X’s performance have been 
with less or no aid? Would it have been very similar, perhaps just with slightly lower 
public investment? Would the withdrawal of aid have provided a ‘wake up’ call, and 
spurred  the  recipient  government  to  improve?  Or  would  it  have  led  to  decline  and 
possibly  conflict?  Evaluation  of  the  impact  of  aid  is  an  intrinsically  difficult  task, 
especially when the impact is sought in a high‐level indicator such as economic growth, 
whose short‐run determinants are often poorly understood. 
Another  reason  is  that  there  are  many  types  of  aid  delivered  in  many  different 
environments.  Aid  covers  emergency  responses  (humanitarian  aid),  the  provision  of 
expertise to governments (technical assistance), the financing of specific investments or 
expenditures  (project  aid),  and  the  provision  of  less  tied  financing  to  recipient 
governments (budget support). In addition, aid goes to a wide‐range of countries, fast‐
growing and slow, peaceful and  unstable. In  such a  varying context, it is simply not 
possible to make a broad‐brush conclusion about the overall performance of aid. 
In summary, a comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness of aid is well beyond the 
scope of this paper. A much simpler approach, and the one taken in this paper, is simply 
to  recognize  that  aid  will  continue  to  represent  a  large  and  probably  growing 
commitment of rich governments and to ask what can be done to make this expenditure 
more effective. 
4. The determinants of aid effectiveness 
What makes aid more or less effective in reducing poverty? The many factors impacting 
on aid effectiveness can be grouped into three different categories. First and foremost, 
the  effectiveness  of  aid  depends  on  the  quality  of  the  government  of  the  country 9 
 
receiving that aid. This argument became influential with the publication of the World 
Bank (1998) Assessing Aid report, which claimed to show that aid was more effective in 
countries which had sounder policies. The econometrics behind this  claim has since 
been debunked (Easterly et al. 2003), but the finding itself appears sound (Dollar & 
Burnside  2004).  It  also  ties  in  with  the  now  widely‐accepted  view  that  domestic 
institutions are the primary determinant of domestic economic performance (Rodrik 
2003). If this is the case, then  one would indeed expect  the productivity of aid in a 
particular country to be a function of the institutions of that country. The emphasis on 
promoting good governance is also supported by the finding that aid is fungible, that is, 
that increased aid funding to a particular sector is at least partially offset by reduced 
government funding to that sector (Swaroop & Devarajan, 1998). If so, the true impact of 
aid  lies  outside  the  sector  directly  receiving  the  funding,  and  donors  need  to  be 
concerned not with individual aid‐funded interventions but with overall governance. 
Second, aid effectiveness depends on the quality of the aid donor. Some analysts argue 
that the performance of aid is undermined because aid donors are not subject to the 
usual accountability and feedback mechanisms which govern public sector operations in 
developed  countries  (Easterly  2006;  Svensson  2008).  The  large  levels  of  discretion 
around aid activities can undermine performance, and aid donors may also lack the local 
and technical knowledge required to be effective operators. 
Third, aid effectiveness depends on  the way  in which the aid business is  organized. 
Donors themselves now recognize that the presence of a large number of aid agencies, 
acting  in  an  uncoordinated  manner,  increases  the  transaction  costs  for  recipient 
governments,  and  can  actually  undermine  the  legitimacy  and  performance  of  the 
governments they are trying to assist.  
Each  of  these  diagnoses  captures  some  of  the  truth  about  aid  effectiveness,  though 
analysts differ on their importance (Box 1). In the view of most economists and aid 
practitioners, the first is the most important. An effective recipient government is able to 
direct the aid process, and so to compensate for weaknesses of donor agencies, and to 
ensure that donor‐government interactions are reasonably well‐organized. This implies 
that  aid  agencies  should  direct  more  aid  to more  effective  governments,  and  try  to 
improve  the  standards  of  governance  in  their  aid  recipients.  However,  both  these 10 
 
strategies can only be pushed so far. Often the risks associated with aid withdrawal are 
particularly high in relation to the worst‐performing governments. And the capacity of 
aid  programs  to  improve  governance  standards  is  often  severely  limited.  Given  this 
limited  scope  for  navigation  in  this  domain,  aid  donors  which  want  to  improve  aid 
effectiveness will also need to focus on the second and third determinants: improving 
their own performance, and strengthening donor coordination. 
The  next  three  sections  examine  each  of  these  three  determinants,  and  explore 
strategies for addressing each of them. One of the benefits of the systematic approach 
taken in this paper is that it helps to situate and compare the various critiques of aid in 
the academic literature. Since 2005, aid effectiveness has become a hot topic with high‐
profile academics writing non‐technical books on the subject which have become best‐
sellers. Box 1 highlights the best known of these three books, and explores how the 
arguments expounded in each can be understood within the framework constructed in 
this paper. 
Box 1: Aid effectiveness as a best seller: Sachs, Easterly and Collier. 
Perhaps because of the growing volumes involved, aid issues have received increased 
international attention in recent years. There is fierce debate over the effectiveness of 
aid among academics. Three recent books on aid have, surprisingly, become best‐sellers: 
Jeffrey Sachs’  The End of Poverty:  economic possibilities for our  time (2005), William 
Easterly’s The White Man’s Burden: why the West’s efforts to aid the rest have done so 
much ill and so little good (2006), and Paul Collier’s The Bottom Billion: why the poor 
countries are failing and what can be done about it (2007). These books give starkly 
different  diagnoses  and  recommendations.  Each  of  them  is  an  exercise  in  advocacy. 
Convincing on their own, their combined effect can be to confuse rather than illuminate. 
The diagnoses of the three books fit neatly into the framework for aid effectiveness 
established in this paper. Collier’s main focus in on the shortcomings of the recipient 
governments,  and  what  donors  can  do  about  them.  Easterly’s  main  focus  is  on  the 
shortcomings of donors themselves, and how performance feedback to donors can be 
strengthened. Sachs argues that the current aid system is dysfunctional, but that aid can 
be effective provided that donors provide more of it and coordinate better: his main aid 
effectiveness focus is thus on donor‐recipient interactions and how to streamline them. 11 
 
Sachs and Easterly are often painted as being poles apart, and they are on some issues. 
Sachs is the leading voice for more aid, Easterly the leading aid critic. Sachs argues for a 
coordinated approach in which recipient governments would take the lead (in line with 
the Paris Declaration, discussed in Section 7), whereas Easterly agues for a competitive, 
decentralized  approach:  only  competition  he  argues  will  give  donor  agencies  the 
incentives they need to lift their game. Collier takes an intermediate position, arguing 
that  donors  should  coordinate  but  only  work  through  governments  when  the 
governments are up to the task. 
But Sachs and Easterly don’t disagree on everything. They share in common scepticism 
about the use of aid to improve governance. Easterly is skeptical about the ability of 
donors to influence the quality of governance in aid recipient countries, and Sachs argue 
that, at least for governments above a minimum performance threshold, the binding 
constraint on economic growth is not governance but investment. Collier is the odd one 
out in relation to governance. He thinks that donors can and should try to influence 
recipient  country  governance,  especially  through  technical  assistance:  Collier 
characterizes technical assistance as a high risk, high reward activity. Collier also thinks 
donors should use conditionality, though in relation to governance rather than policies. 
A final introductory note: there is very little which cannot be considered in some way to 
influence  aid  effectiveness.  This  paper  casts  the  net  broadly,  but  largely  excludes 
analysis of the sectoral composition of aid. Questions such as whether aid is best spent 
on primary or tertiary education, or on roads or health are difficult to answer even in a 
single country, let alone in more general terms. Nor does the paper consider the issue of 
total aid volume. Whether more or less aid should be given depends on the views taken 
in relation to the various effectiveness issues analysed in the next three sections. 
5. Improving recipient government performance. 
Broadly speaking, there are two approaches a donor can pursue in order to improve the 
performance levels of the governments receiving its aid. The donor can give more aid to 
countries which are better performing, or it can try to improve the performance of all its 
recipient governments. This section analyses these two strategies in turn. 12 
 
Both the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank now use explicit performance 
grading systems to guide the allocation of the concessional funds they disburse. These 
funds are distributed according to formulae which give more aid to countries which are 
(a) poorer (b) more populous and (c) better governed. In both cases, Bank staff grade 
countries against various criteria, such as macroeconomic management and corruption. 
These  gradings  are  combined  into  an  overall  performance  rating.  If  there  are  two 
countries of the same size and poverty level, the one with the higher performance rating 
will get more aid funds. 
Western bilateral aid agencies have also started to use performance as a criterion for aid 
allocation. The United States has gone the furthest in this direction with the creation of 
the  Millennium  Development  Corporation  which  has  explicit  governance  and  other 
criteria which have to be met if its funds are to be accessed. AusAID has a Performance 
Incentives program which provides “additional resources to partner governments and 
service  providers  linked  to  pre‐agreed  performance  criteria  and  milestones  being 
met.”11  
Better performing countries do get more aid, at least by some measures. In 2004, among 
low‐income countries those classified (by the rating system mentioned above) as having 
‘very low’ government capacity received less than half aid per capita of those countries 
with ‘high’ capacity: $30 versus $70 (World Bank 2007, Table 4).12 
But the aid industry has also come to recognize the limits of disbursing aid on  the basis 
of performance. Even in the World Bank system, India’s access to concessional aid is 
capped. Application of the formula‐approach would result in much greater concessional 
aid for India. Aid to India is capped to promote aid flows to Africa, presumably since the 
latter is seen as being in greater need, and unable to attract as much private finance. 
More generally, sentiment has shifted in recent years in the direction of providing not 
less but more aid to countries with weakly performing governments. Not only are these 
the poorest countries, but, some argue that, given the anti‐development nature of their 
governments, only aid can provide an external stimulus for change (van de Walle 2005). 
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Moreover, weakly‐performing states can impose costs on others (Collier 2007). All this 
has led to a more proactive and interventionist approach towards such ‘fragile’ or ‘failed’ 
states.13 In the case of Australia, this shift can be seen most  clearly in the case of the 
Solomon Islands. Up to early 2003, despite significant deterioration in law and order in 
the Solomon Islands, Australia ruled out its intervention, on the grounds, in the words of 
the then Australian Foreign   Minister, that  ‘(f)oreigners do not have answers for the 
deep‐seated problems affecting the Solomon Islands’ (Downer 2003). But in June 2003, 
Australia  set  up  the  regional  assistance  mission  for  Solomon  Islands,  RAMSI,  which 
stabilized the situation in the Solomon Islands, and which continues to the current time 
to underwrite law‐and‐order and support development. 
Aid agencies have reconciled on‐going and in some cases increased support for poorly‐
performing countries with a belief in the importance of good governance by making 
more  use  of  the  second  strategy  to  improve  the  levels  of  government  performance 
among aid recipients: using aid itself to promote good governance. For example, aid 
spending by Australia on governance increased from 9% of the total in 1996‐97 to 36% 
in 2005‐06 (AusAID 2005, p. 14). 
There  are  four  main  ways  in  which  aid  can  be  used  to  improve  government 
performance: three of them are well‐established, and the fourth new. Of course,  the 
motive for improving governance is not only that it will improve aid effectiveness but 
also, and more importantly, that it will improve development effectiveness. 
The  first  is  through  technical  assistance.  Technical  assistance  aims,  through  the 
provision of experts and training, to build the capacity of national staff and institutions 
and to deliver technical services, in a wide range of areas from engineering to health to 
financial  management.  Technical  assistance  constitutes  about  25%  of  official  aid  on 
average, and up to 50% in the case of Australia (ODE 2008).  
A second way to improve the performance of the recipient government is through the 
use of conditions and provision of incentives. Whether or not aid is allocated on the 
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basis of performance, donors might set up conditions which need to be met before that 
allocation can be accessed. This is standard in the use of budget aid (that is, aid not tied 
to any particular expenditures), though, as noted earlier, this form of aid makes up only 
about  5%  of  OECD  aid.  Conditions  are  sometimes  also  used  in  aid  earmarked  for 
particular expenditure areas. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
makes  later‐year  funding  for  its  programs  dependent  on  earlier‐year  performance. 
Output‐based aid – where aid is paid only if and when results are delivered – has also 
gained in prominence, with its promotion by the Global Partnership on Output‐Based 
Aid. 
A third and perhaps the oldest way to promote governance is through demonstration 
effects (Collier 2002). If an aid‐financed project, say to build a road, uses transparent 
tendering and strict supervision and manages to produce a good‐quality road for a low 
cost, this could induce the recipient government to replicate the approach embodied in 
the project elsewhere in the sector, and perhaps even in other sectors.14 
A  fourth,  and  much  newer  governance‐promoting  tool  is  for  aid  agencies  to  try  to 
generate  domestic  demand  for  reform.  This  might  be  done  by  supporting 
nongovernment organizations which campaign against corruption, or by other forms of 
support for ‘civil society.’  
All of these mechanisms have potential but each is also problematic.  
The  value of  donor‐provided  technical  assistance  is  much  debated.  Some  argue  that 
donors provide too much technical assistance (Reinikka 2008, p. 186), that advisers are 
all too easily and often ignored, that capacity building is often an elusive goal (AusAID 
2008) and that the provision of advisers can in fact ‘suck out’ rather than build capacity 
(Fukuyama  2004).  Others  have  argued  that  technical  assistance  is  only  effective  in 
support of reforming governments (Collier 2007). Many governments certainly look to 
donors to provide technical assistance. The market for consultancy advice is not well‐
developed in many  developing countries, and especially not  for international advice. 
Countries do not know to whom to turn, and would often find it difficult to negotiate 
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with expatriate experts and to justify and finance the salaries they command within 
their normal budget process. They often find that their own procurement processes are 
cumbersome and would lead to enormous delay in the hiring of consultants. For small 
and fragile states, expatriate staff are required not so much as to build as to provide 
capacity: both the private and the public  sector of  such countries will be reliant on 
imported skilled staff into the indefinite future. 
The  efficiacy  of  conditionality  is  also  much  debated.  Threats  to  withhold  funds  if 
conditions are not met may not be credible since donors are under pressure to disburse. 
Most studies ‘conclude with scepticism about the ability of conditionality to promote 
reform in countries where there is no strong local movement in that direction.’ (World 
Bank 1998, p. 51). Case‐studies (Howes, et al. 2008; Devarajan et al. 2001) show that 
conditionality can be effective at the margin, but also confirm that “policy formulation 
depends primarily on domestic policy‐economy factors” and not on external leverage 
(Devarajan et al. 2001). 
Innovative practices introduced through projects can have a profound effect, but there is 
no guarantee that they will work, let alone be replicated. Even if they are, they may make 
little difference to performance if other, more fundamental governance problems are not 
tackled,  such  as  the  prevalence  of  corruption.  These  problems  may  themselves 
overwhelm the pilot projects.  
Finally, strengthening civil society is another difficult task. Too much donor support can 
undermine the legitimacy of non‐government organizations, leaving them open to the 
accusation that they are serving foreign interests. And countries with weak governments 
typically have weak civil societies. 
One general challenge facing all these methods is the ‘governance paradox,’ first applied 
by  Steedman  (1995)  to  technical  assistance.  Steedman  argued  that  ‘The  greater  the 
constraints posed by governance related factors, the less likely it is that attempts to 
reform the systems of the latter … will succeed.’ This doesn’t only hold for technical 
assistance. It can also be argued that poorly‐performing governments are less likely to 
adhere to conditionalities, are less likely to be able to learn from demonstration projects, 
and  are  less  likely  to  be  open  to  influence  from  civil  society.  If  so,  then  aid  for 16 
 
governance  will  be  least  effective  where  it  is  most  needed,  in  low‐governance 
environments. 
Some argue that  donors should altogether give up attempts to improve  governance. 
William Easterly and Jeffrey Sachs, the two best‐known commentators on aid, disagree, 
often  violently, on  many subjects, but  both share  this opinion  and call for aid to be 
directed  to  specific  sectoral  projects  (see  Box  1)  with  more  concrete  aims,  such  as 
getting more children vaccinated and into school. It is unlikely that this advice will be 
taken. There has been a rethinking in relation to conditionality, where a new emphasis 
on the importance of ownership has led to a downplaying of the use of this tool in recent 
years (see the discussion in Section 7). The emphasis on technical assistance, and the 
actual  results  obtained  from  attempts  to  strengthen  civil  society  will  continue  to 
generate debate and research. While there might be adjustments at the margin, donors 
are unlikely to give up efforts to improve governance, both because the potential pay‐
offs are so large, and because these efforts are often demanded by recipients, who seize 
on aid as a vehicle for reform. 
Aid  effectiveness  discussions  and  aid  allocation  decisions  would  certainly  benefit, 
however,  from  a  greater  realism  about  what  can  be  achieved  by  aid  in  respect  of 
governance. Recall that aid in most countries is a small percentage of GDP, and so has 
limited influence. Where aid is a large percentage of GDP, it is typically in dysfunctional 
environments,  where  government  effectiveness  is  undermined  by  underlying  social 
problems which are not easily addressed, such as instability and plundering politicians. 
We know that aid can in some cases prevent state collapse (consider the experience of 
Solomon  Islands where  external  assistance not  only to the police but  to the central 
ministries of government have been critical in getting the government functioning again 
after the social conflict early this decade). For states not in collapse, aid can have an 
impact on the margin on government performance, but in general domestic institutions 
are likely to have far more influence on the effectiveness of aid than aid will ever have 
on the quality of domestic institutions. 
6. Improving donor agency performance 
As noted earlier, donor programs are ruled by multiple objectives. Clearly, the less the 
extent that poverty reduction is the dominant objective of any donor agency, the less 17 
 
effective it will be with regard to that objective, which is the focus of this paper. Beyond 
this obvious point, why should donor agency performance be a general cause of aid 
ineffectiveness?  Most  bilateral  donor  agencies  are  part  of  developed  country 
governments, and multilateral agencies are funded by such governments. In general, 
developed  countries  have  relatively  well‐performing  governments.  However,  aid 
agencies are different from other government agencies in at least three respects. These 
are the focus of this section. 
The  first  way  in  which  aid  agencies  are  different  is  that  the  normal  feedback 
mechanisms which serve to discipline domestic government agencies do not work in the 
case of aid (Easterly 2002; Svensson 2008). Taxpayers in the donor countries have little 
knowledge and perhaps little interest in the efficiency of aid spending.15 The intended 
beneficiaries (the overseas poor) have a strong interest  in but again may have little 
information and certainly have no direct political influence over aid agencies. Their only 
influence is typically through their own government, and the pressures it can exert, but, 
even for a strong domestic government, the indirect nature of this link must weaken the 
feedback mechanism. 
This weakening of the feedback loop implies that, everything else being equal,   one 
would expect less of a performance orientation from aid agencies than from the average 
domestic government agency. Easterly (2002, abstract) describes the symptoms of this 
in devastating terms, arguing that aid agencies: 
(a) define their output as money disbursed rather than service delivered, (b)  produce 
many low‐return observable outputs like glossy reports and ‘frameworks’ and few high‐
return less observable activities like ex‐post evaluation, (c) engage in obfuscation, spin 
control, and amnesia (like always describing aid efforts as ‘new and improved’) so that 
there is little learning from the past… 
There  have  been  many  calls  in  recent  years  for  greater  attention  to  performance 
monitoring and evaluation (for example, Bannerjee & He 2008), and some progress in 
this direction. Australia has been a leader with the creation within AusAID of an Office of 
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Development  Effectiveness,  and  the  commitment  to  produce  an  Annual  Review  of 
Development  Effectiveness.  The  2005  International  Development  (Reporting  and 
Transparency) Act requires the UK Department for International Development (DfID) to 
produce a similar annual report of its aid allocation and effectiveness.  
While  such  reforms  help  build  a  performance  culture,  they  do  not  substitute  for 
independent evaluation. The multilateral agencies have structures which make it easier 
for  them  to  support  independent  evaluation.  They  all  have  evaluation  offices  which 
report not to the president of the agency but to the board, which represents the share‐
holders.  This  provides  the  evaluation  offices  with  independence  from  management. 
Bilateral  aid  agencies  have  a  different  structure,  with  management  reporting  to  a 
political  head,  such  as  a  Minister.  But  politicians  have  little  incentive  to  support 
independent  monitoring  and  evaluation  since  any  negative  findings  could  be  used 
against them, and/or could undermine public support for aid. Private aid agencies find 
independent evaluation even more threatening, since they fear a negative report will 
hurt fund‐raising efforts. 
How to subject aid (non‐government and government) to a greater dose of independent 
evaluation  is one of the great  challenges facing the aid business.  More rigorous and 
sometimes independent impact evaluations are now being undertaken and promoted 
more widely: a number of new agencies have been set up to promote them.16 Another 
route would be to encourage aid organizations at  least to disclose more information to 
the  public  to  make  it  easier  for  external   evaluations  to  take  place.  The  v alue  of 
improving disclosure was recently   recognized by donors at the 2008 forum on aid 
effectiveness in Accra (discussed   in Section 7). The Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) 
included a commitment by donor agencies, through the International Aid Transparency 
Initiative (IATI), to ‘publicly disclose regular, detailed and timely information on volume, 
allocation and, when available, results of development expenditure.’ 
Even if it is agreed that a greater performance orientation is needed, the appropriate 
performance focus needs to be determined. It is clearly necessary though not sufficient 
to monitor inputs and processes. If internal quality processes are not adhered to, it is 
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unlikely  that  quality  results  will  be  achieved.  Beyond  that,  the  main  debate  centres 
around whether individual projects or broad sectoral or country programs provide the 
appropriate focus for evaluation efforts (see the discussion in Section 7 for more on this 
debate). The intermediate view perhaps makes most  sense: both are important, and 
monitoring and evaluation should be done at both the activity and the program level. 
The second way in which aid agencies differ from other domestic agencies is in  the 
breadth  of  their  coverage.  Domestic  agencies  have  a  national  or  sub‐national 
geographical coverage, and usually focus on just one sector, say education or health. Aid 
agencies have to work across many countries and many sectors. This inevitably imposes 
a much higher knowledge burden on aid agencies, and gives rise to the risk that these 
agencies will lack the knowledge to intervene effectively.17 
Aid agencies have adopted a number of reforms to try to respond to this  knowledge 
challenge. Many have devolved operations to field offices, and hire d local staff, both, in 
part, to build local knowledge. Both these measures are also  likely to reduce staff turn‐
over  which  undermines  knowledge  accumulation.  Hiring  of  thematic  experts  also 
strengthen the sectoral knowledge base and some donors have moved in this direction. 
Another way to respond to the knowledge burden is to try to reduce it by being more 
selective,  that  is,  reducing  the  sectors  and  countries  in  which  the  agency  operates. 
Though often  talked  about, there is unfortunately no evidence  yet  that  selectivity is 
improving among aid agencies. 
The knowledge burden  can  also be reduced  by the type of interventions  supported. 
Lancaster (2002, p.96), drawing on USAID experience in Africa concludes that ‘where 
goals were relatively  simple and technologies were known  (or learned quickly)  and 
brought  tangible  benefits  to  Africans  in  a  relatively  short  period,  they  had  greater 
success and sustainability.’ Projects were ‘less successful when they involved a complex 
set of activities or behavioural or institutional changes’ (p.95).18 
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bring about change. Most aid officials spend a few years in any one country. Few speak local languages … 
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agents of change be deeply knowledgeable about that environment.” (Lancaster 1999, p. 493) 
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A  third  difference  between  aid  agencies  and  domestic  agencies  is  the  enormous 
discretion in aid agency activities: there are so many ways in which aid agencies can 
fulfil their mandates. There are good arguments to work in every poor country, and in 
every sector, and on every cross‐cutting issue. There is little by way of rigorous calculus 
that can guide these choices. The resulting discretion gets exercised at both the political 
and administrative level. It results in a very large number of activities since there is a 
good argument for doing everything and the tendency is to do a little of everything. 
Discretion thus increases complexity and fragmentation and results in agencies working 
in  more  countries  and  sectors  than  is  optimal.  In  the  United  States,  the  Congress 
earmarks funds extensively to specific areas. The U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as 
amended, specifies 33 goals, 75 priority areas, and 247 directives (Radelet 2003, p.3).19 
Many aid programs also suffer from the discr etion exercised by their political leaders 
during visits to recipient countries. Such visits often result in  new projects to generate 
goodwill abroad and positive publicity at home  – commendable objectives, but their 
pursuit in this manner adds to complexity and fragmentation.20 
A  number  of  mechanisms  would  reduce  discretion,  including  greater  operational  
independence  for  aid  agencies,  less  political  involvement  in  day‐to‐day  aid  decision 
making,  the  use  of  standardized  approaches  to  aid  programs  across  countries,  and, 
above all, greater selectivity, through the adoption of subobjectives which are narrower 
in scope and within easier reach than an overriding goal of global poverty reduction. 
7. Improving the productivity of donor-recipient interactions 
Even  if  recipient  governments  and  aid  agencies  were  both  high  performers,  the 
effectiveness  of  aid  could  still  be  hampered  by  the  way  in  which  they  interacted. 
According to a recent World Bank report, ‘the average number of donors per country 
rose from about 12 in the 1960s to about 33 in the 2001‐2005 period.’ (2007, p. ii). At 
the turn of the century, the average bilateral donor operated in about 100 countries 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
improving the accountability of newly elected governments. Very little is known about how effectively to 
strengthen judiciaries, civil society organizations or the civil service. Yet much of what foreign aid tries to 
do at present is activities, like these, involving institutional or behavioural change.’ (Lancaster 1999, p. 
493) 
19 http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/2920  
20 Collier (2007) notes that Clare Short when secret ary of state for international development delinked 
‘disbursements of aid from her own visits,’ but puts this forward as the exception that proves the rule. 21 
 
(Acharya et al. 2006). Donor fragmentation has likely worsened since then, with any 
shifts in the direction of country selectivity more offset by a greater number of donors. 
The move to whole‐of‐government approaches to aid delivery has further exacerbated 
the problem of fragmentation. In the case of the United States, the world’s largest donor, 
the main aid agency, USAID, is responsible for less than 40% of total aid, and, according 
to  the  analysis  of  Brainard  (2006)  some  25  agencies  pursue  some  50  development 
objectives, most of them independently.  
Not  only  the  number  of  donors  but  the  number  of  projects  has  also  been  rising. 
Comprehensive data is difficult to obtain, but a database of OECD aid‐financed projects 
indicates  a  rise  from  20,000  in  1997  to  60,000  in  2004. The  same  database  shows, 
somewhat surprisingly, given the rise in total aid volumes in recent years, a fall in the 
size of the average project or activity, from about $2.5 million (pg. 25) to about $1.5 
million over the same period (World Bank 1997). (Countries rated by the Bank as having 
‘very  low’  governance  get  on  average  half  the  aid  of  those  in  the  ‘high’  governance 
capacity but almost exactly the same number of projects.) 
This worsening fragmentation implies a growing waste of resources on the part of both 
donors and recipient governments, and in particular a major burden on poor and over‐
stretched governments. Tanzania is a widely cited example in this regard: 
“Tanzanian government officials had to prepare about 2,000 reports of different 
kinds to donors and receive more than 1,000 donor delegations each year. These 
requirements  tax  rather  than  build  provider  organizations’  limited  capacities 
distorting  efforts  towards  satisfying  donor  obligations  rather  than  reporting  to 
domestic policymakers.” (Reinikka 2008, p. 185) 
Health  is  perhaps  the  most  fragmented  sector,  with  some  100  multilateral  health 
agencies as well as probably all bilaterals active in this area. The results of this over‐
crowding include resource misallocation  (in particular, HIV/AIDS  receiving far more 
funding than is warranted given its importance as a disease)21 and more importantly an 
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overwhelming  of  government:  many  specialized  government  managers  are  attracted 
away to better‐paying donor‐funded health projects; those left behind spend much of 
their time dealing with these same projects.22 
In addition, the larger the number of donors, the more difficult donor coordination is. 
Leaving donors to “do their own thing” can undermine governments as donors come to 
be seen  as responsible for basic  government services and more generally for taking 
development initiatives. 
The Paris Declaration of 2005 is both a recognition of and response to the problems in 
the  way  the  business  of  aid  is  conducted.  Signed  on  March  2,  2005  by  35  donor 
countries, 26 multilateral donors, 56 recipient countries, and 14 civil society observers, 
the Declaration is arranged around five themes – ownership, alignment, harmonisation, 
development results and mutual accountability – with obligations under each of these 
for both donors and recipient governments. The core of the Declaration, in particular as 
it imposes obligations on donors, is in relation to two of the above five themes, namely 
alignment and harmonisation.23 
The vision of the Paris Declaration is that all donors would come together to act jointly 
under  government  leadership.  This  requires  both   harmonization  (of  donors)  and 
alignment (behind the recipient government). 
Harmonization requires first of all greater selectivity, or as the Declaration puts it a 
‘more effective division of labour’. Those donors which remain engaged in a particular 
country  or  sector  should  act  jointly,  through  such  means  as  joint  projects,  joint 
assessments,  and  joint  missions.  Though  not  mentioned  in  the  Declaration,  greater 
harmonization would also require donor countries to tackle fragmentation within their 
own aid program, either by returning aid‐delivery responsibilities to a single agency, or 
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be overwhelmed by the proliferation of multiple GHPs [Global Health Partnerships] (and other HIV/AIDS 
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by ensuring at least that one agency has a clear leadership role in the delivery of aid. 
This would imply a greater status for the aid agency, for example, by giving it Cabinet‐
representation  at  the  political  level,  an  arrangement  which  is  uncommon  but  not 
unheard of in the aid world today. (In the UK, DFID is represented in Cabinet by the 
Secretary of State for International Development.) 
Alignment  requires  donors,  acting  jointly,  to  act  under  government  leadership. 
Specifically, this means that donors would expend their funds not through their own 
projects  and  Bank  accounts,  but  through  government  systems,  and  accounts.  It  also 
means that donors would not pressure governments to reforms they are keen on, but 
would rather help governments implement reforms they have already decided on. 
Progress with respect to the Paris Declaration was recently assessed at the follow‐up 
October  2008  Accra,  Ghana  meeting  of  donors  and  recipient  governments,  which 
produced the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA). This largely reinforced Paris principles, 
though with a new emphasis on transparency and disclosure (Section 6). 
Realization  of  the  Paris  Declaration  vision  would  constitute  a  revolution  in  the  aid 
world. Donors have been promising better coordination for decades (Easterly 2003), 
with little to show for it. A 2008 official review reports mixed progress, and notes a 
paucity of data and limited political buy‐in (Working Party on Aid Effectiveness, 2008). 
The Declaration’s targets are ambitious: for example, that 90% of donors should use in‐
country  procurement  and  financial  management  systems  (where  these  are  rated  by 
donors to be satisfactory) and that 66% of aid should be programme‐based. It is unclear 
what the baselines are, but they are surely well below these targets. An evaluation of the 
UK DFID states that ‘DFID has already achieved most of the Paris Declaration targets, 
and  there  is  no  reason  why  it  should  not  achieve  the  remaining  targets  by  2010.’ 
(Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  Denmark  2008,  Annex  7.17).  However,  at  the  other 
extreme,  the  United  States,  the  world’s  largest  donor,  persists  with  tied  aid  (under 
Congressional mandate), refuses to use in‐country procurement systems, and is also 
very reluctant to use national financial management systems. The recent DAC review of 
Australian aid paints a ‘mixed picture’ for Australia with good performance ‘in areas like 
joint donor approaches and aid untying’ but ‘weaker results in its use of partner country 24 
 
systems,  the  share  of  aid  flows  channelled  through partner  country  budgets  and  its 
reliance on parallel project units.’ (DAC 2008, p. 19). 
Some aspects of the Paris Declaration command universal support, such as its support 
for  devolution  and  selectivity.  But  others  are  more  controversial.  One  counter‐
suggestion is that the aid business would benefit not from greater coordination, which 
smacks of central planning, but from more competition. A 
more structured competition between donors would see, for example, poor individuals 
or communities in developing countries being given aid vouchers which they could use 
to contract development services from accredited providers of their choice (Easterly 
2008; see also Klein & Harford 2005). Donors do something like this through their Social 
Funds, which provides flexible aid to poor communities. Scaling up this approach would 
nevertheless  be  radical  as  it  would  challenge  the  role  of  the  aid  staples:  technical 
assistance, program aid and budget support. 
A less radical alternative to gift vouchers, but one in the same spirit, is the suggestion 
that that donors should work around recipient governments, rather than trying to fix 
them or act towards them in a more coordinated, less‐taxing way. This strategy would 
see donors increasing their funding to the private sector, non‐government organizations 
and the provision of global public goods (such as medical and agricultural research). 
While not a substitute for harmonization and alignment, it is a strategy that deserves a 
lot more attention. A 2006 statement by the heads of the European Investment Bank, 
and the German and French aid agencies to the IMF reported that ‘an increasing number 
of  development  partners  today  acknowledge  the  importance  of  channeling  more 
resources, more directly, toward the private sector.’ (De Fontaine Vive et al. 2006). 
One off‐cited risk with the Paris Declaration  approach is that  putting funds through 
government  systems  in  poor  countries  might  mean  greater  loss  of  funds  due  to 
corruption  and  greater  delay  than  if  they  were  expensed  through  donor  systems 
(Svensson  2008).  It  was  noted  earlier,  for  example,  that  some  governments  prefer 
donors to procure technical assistance directly since it is simpler and quicker for them. 
This is a difficult issue, with no clear answer. Even judged on the issue of corruption and 
leakage alone, the result is unclear, since, even if it makes individual interventions more 
vulnerable, working with government systems enables donors to put more pressure on 25 
 
and  resources  to  governments  for  their  improvement.  And  so,  even  if  leakage  does 
increase, it might be worth it, for the reduction in transaction costs. On the other hand, 
the Paris Declaration itself recognizes that alignment might not work so well in fragile 
states.24 For example, the Paris performance targets require use by donors of partner 
government procurement and financial systems  only if these systems are rated to be 
satisfactory  (with  reference  to  a  specific  performance  rating  system).  For  donors 
themselves, fears about corruption are doubtless the main barrier standing in the way of 
greater alignment. Some donors take a middle ground, with funds going through partner 
systems, but with additional safeguards. But this can result in the worst of both worlds, 
with additional bureaucratic requirements for little by way of benefits. Perhaps the best 
one can say is that donors certainly should try to strengthen government systems, and 
procure government involvement in their projects, but will sometimes need to fall short 
of actual reliance on those systems. 
Another  unintended  consequence  of  the  Paris  Declaration  could  be  weakening  of 
performance  orientation.  The  Declaration  takes  donors  away  from  specific,  discrete 
projects  in  the  direction  of  broad,  often  sectoral  programs,  which  can  be  harder  to 
evaluate. Views are divided on this trend away from projects. There are those who argue 
that  a greater focus on  project‐level evaluation  is essential for donor accountability. 
Bannerjee (2007) agues ‘we need to go back to financing projects and insist that the 
results  be  measured.’  Easterly  concurs  that  what  is  needed  is  ‘not  overall  sweeping 
evaluations of a whole nationwide development program, but specific and continuous 
evaluation of particular interventions’ (2006, p. 194) 
However,  there  are  strong  arguments  against  a  projectized  approach.  First,  not  all 
interventions  are  amenable  to  rigorous  evaluation:  technical  assistance  in  particular 
falls into this category. And project‐level evaluations do not capture the wider benefits 
and costs of aid. A number of projects taken together might have an aggregate effect: 
perhaps, on the positive side, promoting reform; or, on the negative side, overwhelming 
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for basic service delivery.’ (para. 37) The Declaration calls on donors still to harmonize but notes that 
alignment may not be possible. (para. 39). The 2008 Review notes: ‘The Declaration’s relevance is perhaps 
strongest in low‐income countries that receive large amounts of aid, and combine significant capabilities 
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host  governments.  Collier  (2002,  p.2)  argues  for  this  reason  that  ‘project‐level 
performance is an inadequate instrument for attaining donor objectives,’ and that aid 
should be assessed at the country level.25 Second, the project‐approach is also ill‐suited 
to  donors  supporting  governments  with  long‐term  recurrent  funding  to  fulfil  core 
responsibilities, such as road maintenance and schooling. Third, the project‐approach 
takes  no  account  of  the  fungibility  critique:  namely  that  donor  funding  of  one 
intervention can simply shift government funds elsewhere. 
Finally,  the  Paris  Declaration’s  downplaying  of  conditionality  might  help  promote 
domestic  government  responsibility  for  reform  but,  by  reducing  donor  pressure  for 
them, may make reforms harder to implement (Lancaster 2002). In this area, as with the 
issue  of  working  through  government  systems,  the  Declaration  gives  donors 
considerable wriggle room: it calls on them to ‘[d]raw conditions wherever possible 
from a partner’s national development strategy.’ 
8. Conclusions  
That there are so many factors which influence aid effectiveness which might give the 
impression  that  it  is  highly  unlikely  that  all  obstacles  will  ever  be  successfully 
negotiated, and that aid could ever be effective. But this would be misleading. As set out 
in Section 2, it is impossible to give a definitive answer to the question: is aid effective? 
There are certainly many productive ways to spend additional aid, and aid volumes are 
likely to continue to rise. This in turn makes the question of improving aid effectiveness 
all the more important. 
The starting point for this paper is the performance of the recipient government. But 
even if the mainstream position is accepted that this is the most important determinant 
of aid effectiveness, and indeed of development success, the extent to which donors can 
influence this determinant is both limited and unclear. Withdrawing aid from poorly 
governed countries is an attractive strategy, but one that can only be pursued within 
limits. None of the strategies to improve the governance environment within which aid 
is expensed have a proven track‐ record in low‐governance environments: from the use 
of technical assistance and conditionality, through to the use of demonstration impacts 
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from  individual  projects  and  the  generation  of  demand  for  reform.  The  potential 
rewards from attempting to improve governance are so high that donors will continue 
to invest resources in this direction, but the limits of donor influence over recipient 
performance  also  make  it  imperative  to  look  at  other  strategies  to  improve  aid 
performance. 
The second determinant of aid performance is the performance of the donor. The paper 
has argued that overseas aid agencies may perform worse than domestic aid agencies 
because: they are less subject to performance feedback; they face a greater knowledge 
burden; and they are high‐discretion organizations. The strategies to respond to these 
weaknesses  are:  a  greater  performance  orientation,  in  particular  independent 
evaluation;  greater  selectivity;  devolution  and  other  efforts  to  expand  sectoral  and 
country  knowledge;  the  use  of  simple  and  standardized  interventions;  and  greater 
operational independence for aid agencies. 
The third determinant of aid effectiveness is the way in which recipients and donors 
interact, and in particular the problem of donor fragmentation. Donors can reduce the 
burden on recipient governments by being more selective, by ensuring coordination of 
their own agencies delivering aid, and by working more through alternative channels, 
including  non‐government  organizations,  multilaterals,  the  private  sector,  and 
international public good providers. In line with the Paris Declaration, donors should 
cooperate much more, and find appropriate ways to allow governments to influence and 
direct their programs, even when this has to fall short of working through government 
systems. 
It is evident that some strategies influence more than one determinant of aid, and thus 
involve either synergies or trade‐offs. Selectivity emerges strongly as a strategy that will 
positively affect all three determinants (on the first, assuming that the selectivity is in 
favour of better‐performing governments). Devolution also emerges as a strategy that 
will positively affect both the second and third determinants (since it improves country 
knowledge and facilitates government‐ donor coordination). Two strategies, however, 
clearly  involve  trade‐offs.  The  alignment  and  harmonization  agenda  of  the  Paris 
Declaration takes donors away 28 
 
from the use of individual projects and their own systems, and thus makes it harder to 
make them individually accountability for results, and may make aid more susceptible to 
corruption by forcing reliance on less‐robust government systems. Likewise the move 
away from conditionality under the Paris Declaration may make it harder to promote 
governance and policy reforms. 
Aid effectiveness is subject to many and complex determinants, the most important of 
them beyond the reach of donors. There are no magic bullets, there is no aid revolution 
just around the corner, and international progress in improving aid effectiveness will 
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